My latest from the Guelph Mercury.
September 17, 2009
On Aug. 27, Polish media began reporting that the Obama administration would not pursue an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield for eastern Europe. Since that time, other media have confirmed Washington’s growing reluctance to see the initiative through.
An undertaking of Obama’s predecessor, president George W. Bush, the ABM program for eastern Europe would have featured a radar system in the Czech Republic and 10 missile interceptor sites in Poland. The Bush administration sought to justify the implementation of this eastern European ABM shield — which required America’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty — as necessary to defend Europe from Iranian missile attack.
Obama reportedly agreed to spike the initiative in exchange for the Russian Federation’s co-operation in securing Iran’s verifiable suspension of all military nuclear activities. This, the reasoning goes, would have undercut the need for the program in the first place, enabling the United States to achieve its security objectives without pursuing a policy antagonistic to Russia. This was all part of “resetting” — Obama’s diplomatic shibboleth — U.S.-Russian relations.
This was a mistake on the administration’s behalf, however, which leaves the U.S. weaker, eastern Europeans more vulnerable, and Iran dangerously emboldened.
First of all, Obama traded away a bargaining chip to Russia in exchange for future payment — specifically, Russia’s help in making sure Iran does not achieve a military nuclear capability. This is naiveté worthy of the Carter administration, and reveals what more hawkish security analysts suspected all along: Obama was simply searching for an excuse to abandon a project ideologically antithetical to his own views.
As a result, Iran is now no less dangerous and Russia is now no less obstructionist. In fact, the Russian Federation vigorously broadcasts its opposition to further sanctions on Iran, let alone military strikes. As a permanent, veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council, this all but ensures the UN no longer represents a viable platform for decisively managing Iran’s ongoing nuclear activities.
Second, Obama’s abandonment of an ABM shield for eastern Europe is precisely the wrong move at precisely the wrong time. Why? Under Obama, ABM defence for Europe makes sense. Under Bush, it didn’t.
ABM defence was always a suspicious, illogical initiative under Bush’s watch because the Bush administration would never have accepted Iranian nuclear armament in the first place. Rejecting defensive containment strategies as flaccid and dangerous, Bush instead pursued a policy of nuclear counter-proliferation in the Middle East: a forward-leaning policy of ensuring nuclear threats from rogue states never materialize.
Under Obama, however, ABM defence is logical. This defensive policy of nuclear containment fits with the current president’s less-hawkish, more-multilateral approach to international relations. Since Obama’s Washington remains unwilling to commit the U.S. to attacking Iranian nuclear or missile facilities should diplomacy fail, the abortive ABM shield would have given U.S. allies in the region an insurance policy against the Obama administration’s possible resignation to Iran’s nuclear trajectory.
Having adopted a less assertive global security strategy than his predecessor, the ABM shield was an opportunity for Obama to show strength to the international community and build confidence in his restrained and cautious foreign policy. He could have shown resolve in the face of Russian intransigence, Iranian belligerence, western European insouciance, and American war fatigue.
Not only has he lost that opportunity, but in forgoing ABM defence for eastern Europe, Obama has predicated American foreign and defence policy less on American capability, and more on Russian good will.
Not a good bet. Just ask the Poles and the Czechs.
Matthew Bondy writes on international relations and domestic politics, and is a featured commentator at PolicyNet.org, an online academic community administered by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, in Waterloo. He can be reached at m.j.bondy@gmail.com
