Photo Credit: NYT
The NYT has a good piece on Russia’s mentality following the Georgian offensive.
MOSCOW — As the Russian Army withdrew most of its forces from Georgia, it was becoming ever more clear on Friday that Moscow had no intention of restoring what once was — either on the ground or diplomatically.
Not exactly a galloping shock.
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Oh, and remember that whole Kosovo thing?
At the same time, the Kremlin is nearing formal recognition of the independence of the enclaves, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, possibly as early as next week.
Perfect.
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Francis Fukuyama, of “The End of History” fame, has a piece in today’s WAPO.
In lieu of big ideas, Russia and China are driven by nationalism, which takes quite different forms in each country. Russia, unfortunately, has settled on a version of national identity that is incompatible with the freedom of the countries on its borders; I’m afraid that Georgia will not be the last former Soviet republic to suffer from Moscow’s sense of wounded pride. But today’s Russia is still very different from the former Soviet Union. Putin has been called a modern-day czar, which is far closer to the mark than misguided comparisons to Stalin or Hitler. Czarist Russia was a great power with limited ambitionsthat became an integrated member of the European state system of the 18th and 19th centuries even as it crushed the weak states on its borders and deprived its own people of liberties. It is in this direction that I expect post-Putin Russia will evolve.
I think that part’s bang on.
As one of my favourite professors, John (Ivan) Jaworsky, likes to remind his classes, Russia is torn by several identities. Imperialism, Pan-Slavism, Ideology and other competing claims on Russia’s identity all vie for pre-eminence in Russia’s national consciousness. As she rouses from her troubled slumbers of the last decade-and-a-half, it seems like Russia is edging toward the kind of national identity that makes for rough neighbourhoods.
Francis Fukuyama, of “The End of History” fame…
LOL! I cannot help but respect a man who has the cojones to assume that his opinions still matter after having watched the events of the last seven years take a sledgehammer to the thesis of the work upon which his entire scholarly reputation (such as it is) rests.
Czarist Russia was a great power with limited ambitions that became an integrated member of the European state system of the 18th and 19th centuries…
Indeed. And this process was smiled upon by the Western members of the Concert of Europe who were happy to countenance the sight of domestic Czarist oppression as long as, in the end, the Westphalian consensus upon which European “stability” depended was perpetuated.
The same Western attitude obtains today (viz. Western tolerance of Russia’s brutal suppression of the Chechen insurgency) with one crucial new factor: dwindling global oil supplies. That is the issue, not the liberties aspired to by the “weak states on its borders”, that will drive the American response to Russia’s renewed self-assurance.
Am I to understand that you’re a U. of Waterloo alumnus? I did my undergraduate work there–B.A. ‘95.
“The same Western attitude obtains today (viz. Western tolerance of Russia’s brutal suppression of the Chechen insurgency) with one crucial new factor: dwindling global oil supplies. That is the issue, not the liberties aspired to by the “weak states on its borders”, that will drive the American response to Russia’s renewed self-assurance.”
I think you just may be right, Sir Francis. The conflict between Russia and Georgia marks the beginning of (what will likely turn out to be) a return of great power realpolitik.
The United States is in a very odd position, however. Whilst it’s hard to compare the relative power of the British Empire and the American empire having taken into account the different circumstances in which each operated, let us say the American empire is just as strong as the British Empire was.
The US is the head of many more global alliances and bears (or at least perceives to bear) much more responsibility for the welfare of foreign states than the British Empire ever did. As the leader of so many multi-national organisations and the security guarantor of so many states around the world, it remains to be seen whether American power equally weighty as American responsibilities.
If Russia and China push back against the existing order, American global hegemony could expire and profoundly threaten extant security arrangements in every region of the globe.
When it comes to managing the rise of Russia and China, and integrating these two states into the existing American order, we’re talking about the fate of liberal internationalism as a practicable M.O. for the state system. Heady stuff.
If the global security environment is just returning to its old habits, that’s one thing. I just hope great powers will remember how to skirmish without using nuclear weapons.
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Yes, I have just recently graduated from a BA (Hons, PSCI) at UW, and I begin an MA there in the Fall.
Go Warriors!
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