
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
The Economist, anti-climactically, has a great write-up on the on-going Russian problem.
In particular, the article talks about the likely outcome of Russia recognising Abkhazia and S. Ossettia as independent states:
Russia likes to draw parallels with Kosovo—a state carved out of Serbia as a result of Western military intervention. But the parallel is superficial. Few embassies will open in South Ossetia (which, following the ethnic cleansing of its Georgian population, has a population little bigger than that of Liechtenstein). Close Russian allies such as Belarus and Tajikistan will be keen to put on a show of support. Others may be more chary of recognising Russian puppet states as independent countries. Moldova and Azerbaijan, for example, have headaches with similar entities, Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they are the result of ethnic flare-ups in the dying days of the Soviet Union. Russian allies farther afield, such as Venezuela and Cuba, may be tempted to join in the humiliation of the West.
As Matt reminded us yesterday over at Foreign Policy Watch, the similarity between recognising Kosovo and recognising these break-away regions may indeed be “superficial” as The Economist claims. But distinctions between these scenarios matters less than the fact that it’s happening at all. Far less. Politics is politics, and now both sides have fodder.
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The article’s second major theme deals with Russia’s willingness to buck the West:
… for now, criticism of the Kremlin’s actions in Georgia seems to be fuelling the Russian leadership’s determination to do more of the same. Public opinion seems strongly behind the muscular new foreign policy, seeing it as a sign that Russia has recovered from the weakness of the 1990s. Russia seems not to care that Western countries are now threatening to block its membership of the World Trade Organisation.
Indeed, Russia feels it can easily withstand Western displeasure. Soaring oil and gas prices have put nearly $600 billion in its hard-currency reserves. Many Russians reckon that in the end the big European countries that matter will decide that they care more about trade ties and reliable energy supplies than they do about Georgia. On the evidence so far, that assessment may be correct.
This is certainly likely, if not cast in stone.
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This whole kerfuffle begs international affairs watchers to challenge some of the underlying assumptions in the younger Bush’s foreign policy. All the talk about democracy and human rights binds American prestige to all democracies, whatever their strategic importance or irrelevance. Did President Bush (or, let’s be honest, most of the rest of us) really consider what the US would have to do in order to match its rhetoric in the event of great power tinkering in sovereign states?
Therein lies the problem of the Bush Doctrine. It is not realism; it is wild-eyed idealism, and it is only under-written by hard power to the extent Americans are willing to go to war for countries like Georgia.
For that matter, should America be willing to go to war over Georgia? I imagine a lot of us are struggling with that question right now. But let us at least admit that the answer is not self-evident. Georgia is not virginally pure in all that’s gone on. It was Georgia that altered the status quo.
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Which brings us to GOP presidential nominee Senator John McCain’s (R-AZ) comments that “today, we are all Georgians.” He’s been assailed over this by lots of armchair foreign ministers, so I’ll refrain from passing judgement.
Regardless of my sincere admiration for Senator McCain, he, like Obama, seems torn in several different directions on foreign policy. Is he a neo-conservative or a realist? For that matter, is it evidently true that his views are informed by an ideological commitment? Is his tendency to escalate conflicts an expression of sound strategic planning as opposed to nationalist zeal?
Though I intuitively trust McCain on foreign policy, and his visceral instincts resonate with me, the ambiguity remains a bit troubling.